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Abstract: 
Two experiments examined three- to six-year-olds' use of frequency and intention information to 
make trait attributions and behavioral predictions. In experiment 1, participants were told a story 
about an actor who behaved positively once or four times on purpose or incidentally. Children 
were most likely to make trait-consistent behavioral predictions after hearing about several 
positive, intentional behaviors. Trait attributions were largely positive. Experiment 2 examined 
children's use of the same cues concerning negative behavioral outcomes. Participants tended to 
predict that actors who engaged in negative behavior would do so again, irrespective of intention, 
although younger children required more exemplars than older children. Participants were most 
likely to make negative trait attributions after hearing about multiple intentional behaviors; 
however, there was reluctance with age to describe actors as mean. Implications for children's 
‘theory of personality’ are discussed. 
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Introduction 
People draw on many sources of information to make trait attributions. We make attributions 
about others based on their physical appearance (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005), 
knowledge about their intentions and behavior (Malle, 2004), intuitive ideas about their social 
groups (e.g., Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001), and information gathered from their friends (e.g., 
Funder & West, 1993). These and other factors might be considered independently or in tandem 
when making a trait attribution. Attributions are also affected by our expectations that behavior 
varies across situations (see Kammrath, Mendoza-Denton, & Mischel, 2005). In short, there is a 
daunting amount of information that can be used to make trait attributions. 
 
There is considerable interest in the nature of children's attributions about others, and this is an 
important topic due in part to its relevance to children's social functioning, including personal 
relationships (see Runions & Keating, 2007) and prejudice and stereotyping (see Bigler & Liben, 
2007). Here, we focus on two sources of information that influence children's trait attributions: 
behavioral frequency (i.e., number of times a person engages in trait-relevant behaviors) and 
intention (i.e., intentional versus unintentional behaviors). Previous trait attribution research 
focused on children's use of frequency and intention independently. Of interest here was whether 
children can integrate these cues when making trait attributions. For example, children should be 
highly likely to make a ‘mean’ judgment after seeing several intentional, trait-relevant behaviors, 
and less so if they have seen one unintentional, trait-relevant behavior. We also examined the 
impact of valence (i.e., positive or negative behavior) on trait attributions. 
 
Frequency Information and Trait Understanding 
Generally, children's trait attributions vary based on behavioral frequency (e.g., Ferguson, van 
Roozendaal, & Rule, 1986; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). For example, given an actor's name only 
(‘Tommy’) or three exemplars of the actor's behavior, 6- to 10-year-olds were more likely to 
make trait-relevant behavioral predictions and attributions in the latter case (Gnepp & 
Chilamkurti, 1988). In another study, three- to six-year-olds were more likely to make 
appropriate trait attributions about an actor after watching five behaviors rather than one 
behavior (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Yet, frequency effects are not always obtained (e.g., Heller & 
Berndt, 1981) or are found only in late childhood. Rholes and Ruble reported that by nine years 
of age, children could distinguish between low- and high-frequency information to predict cross-
situational stability of behavior. 
 
Discrepant findings concerning frequency effects may be explained by variations in the amount 
of information provided or whether the information was explicit. For example, Rholes and Ruble 
did not specify the number of times an actor performed a behavior; thus, it is unknown how 
children interpreted the ambiguous information. Younger children require more evidence than 
older children to make trait attributions and behavioral predictions (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). 
Moreover, children might benefit from explicit intention information to make trait attributions, 
and this is not always provided. For example, Boseovski and Lee made no reference to actors' 
intentions. This could be problematic, given findings that children sometimes infer positive 
intentions (e.g., Jones & Thomson, 2001) or hostile intentions in the absence of explicit 
information (e.g., Dodge, 2006; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). A central goal of this study was 
to determine whether provision of strong support cues, in the form of explicit intention and 
frequency information, results in appropriate trait attributions and behavioral predictions by 
young children. 
 
Intention Information and Trait Understanding 
Intention understanding is central to moral and trait reasoning (Young & Saxe, 2009), and 
several studies have examined the use of intention in each of these domains (e.g., Bennett, 1985–
1986; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Rotenberg, 1980). Generally, 
preschoolers distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior when making trait 
attributions. For example, three- and four-year-olds were more likely to label as ‘naughty’ 
protagonists who violated a rule intentionally (i.e., refusal to wear a hat) instead of 
unintentionally (hat falls off; Núñez & Harris, 1998). 
 
Other studies examined consideration of intention and behavioral outcome information in moral 
or trait attributions (Farnill, 1974; Heyman & Gelman, 1998; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). 
Nelson (1980) gave three- to four-year-olds and six- to eight-year-olds positive or negative 
motive information and positive or negative outcome information about an actor. In the positive 
motive-negative outcome condition, participants were told that the actor wanted to throw a ball 
to the recipient, but accidentally hit him. Even three-year-olds considered intentions when 
evaluating the actor as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. However, these children had more difficulty than older 
children recalling the story when there was incongruence between motives and outcomes. Even 
in older children, who are more capable of integrating intention and outcome information, 
judgments can be swayed by outcome knowledge (e.g., Farnill, 1974; Heyman & Gelman, 1998). 
Thus, one question is whether provision of explicit intention information may be especially 
helpful in guiding children's trait attributions. Also, because previous studies included only one 
intention-outcome scenario, it is unknown how variations in frequency affect the processing of 
intention information, and this was another question that guided this work. 
 
Current Study 
These experiments are the first to examine whether children integrate frequency and intention 
information in trait attributions and behavioral predictions. Addressing this question will provide 
insight about the developmental sequence through which specific cues are implicated in trait 
understanding, which is nascent in early childhood. Children's perception of behavior as goal 
directed—coupled with increased attention with age to statistical information—may ultimately 
enable them to reason about personality traits (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010). Thus, we 
generally expected that children would be more likely to make trait attributions and behavioral 
predictions when given multiple exemplars of intentional behavior and less likely to do so after a 
single, unintentional behavior. Provision of strong support cues was expected to be especially 
useful for younger children, who typically require more information than older children to make 
trait attributions (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). 
 
Although some research indicates that children readily make intention inferences, we presented 
intention information explicitly to examine responses in a maximally supportive condition and 
also because children sometimes have difficulty remembering mismatched intentions and 
outcomes or make outcome-based decisions as discussed above. The nature of this difficulty may 
be representational and is thought to reflect late maturation of the right temporo-parietal junction, 
which is implicated in moral reasoning (Young & Saxe, 2009). Provision of explicit cues about 
behavior and intention may be especially useful for children's behavioral predictions, as children 
find it especially difficult to make behavior-to-behavior inferences (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 
2007). Strong support cues were expected to result in an enhanced ability to make behavioral 
predictions in this study as compared to previous research. 
 
Our study design enabled us to add to research that assessed whether children have a 
psychologically meaningful understanding of traits, which entails the appreciation that behaviors 
have different implications for trait attributions depending on their associated mental states 
(Heyman, 2009). Although researchers have examined children's perception of intentional and 
unintentional behaviors in trait attributions, it is unclear whether variations in behavioral 
frequency affect the processing of such information, and this is important for determining which 
cue may be more salient at particular points in development. For example, how might children 
interpret high-frequency, unintentional behaviors? If they are especially sensitive to behavioral 
outcomes, as some suggest (e.g., Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007), then frequency 
information may override intention information at all ages. However, given children's strong 
tendency to focus on intention information early in childhood (see Wellman, 2011; Woodward, 
2009), the youngest children may be so attuned to intention that they are unable integrate it with 
frequency information, as older children would be expected to do. 
 
In addition to our main focus on niceness/meanness attributions and behavioral predictions, we 
asked children to make attributions about the actors' intelligence and to indicate whether they 
would befriend the actor. Intelligence attributions were included to assess whether children 
associate intelligence with intentionality (e.g., assume that someone who commits unintentional 
actions repeatedly is less intelligent) and to examine whether children assume that positive 
behaviors are associated with intelligence (see Stipek & Daniels, 1990, for a discussion 
concerning overgeneralization of positive traits). Assessment of friendship endorsement provided 
an additional way of determining whether children differentiate trait attributions and behavioral 
predictions based on the information presented. For example, we expected that children would be 
more likely to want to befriend an actor who engaged in intentional positive behaviors than one 
whose behavior resulted in an unintended positive outcome. 
 
Finally, we examined the impact of behavioral valence on trait attributions. Research indicates 
that children tend to be highly influenced by positive information in social judgments. Three- to 
six-year-olds are more likely to endorse positive rather than negative testimony about a stranger 
(Boseovski, 2012), and they prefer to ask for information from, and endorse the testimony of, 
nice people (Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, in press). Concerning trait attributions, children 
sometimes disregard negative behavioral information entirely (Boseovski & Lee, 2008) and give 
greater weight to positive than negative information in their judgments (see Boseovski, 2010). 
For example, three- to six-year-olds judged an actor as ‘nice’ irrespective of viewing one or five 
positive behaviors, but required five negative behaviors to say ‘mean’ (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). 
Moreover, children expect positive behavior when given neutral or negative intention 
information (Grant & Mills, 2011) and assume that negative characteristics will change in a 
positive direction (e.g., Heyman & Giles, 2004; Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002). 
 
Although valence clearly impacts trait attributions, it is unknown whether positive or negative 
valence information is treated differentially based on variations in intention and frequency, and 
this can be informative for learning about conditions that perpetuate or attenuate biased 
processing. For example, children may be less likely to make indiscriminate positive attributions 
when negative intention information is presented explicitly. Thus, we examined the use of these 
cues for positive information (experiment 1) and negative information (experiment 2). 
 
 
Experiment 1 
Several studies have investigated children's use of positive behavioral information to make trait 
attributions. There are mixed findings regarding the importance of frequency information. In 
some cases, preschool and elementary school-aged children make positive attributions 
irrespective of frequency (Heller & Berndt, 1981); in others, children make more positive 
attributions in high-frequency conditions (e.g., Gnepp & Chilamkurti, 1988). As mentioned 
above, children differentiate intention types (e.g., Nelson, 1980), but they are influenced by 
positive behavioral outcomes (see Heyman & Gelman, 1998). Finally, even eight- and nine-year-
olds treat ambiguous intentional information as positive (Grant & Mills, 2011). 
 
Less is known about children's perception of unintended beneficial outcomes (i.e., actor's 
intentions are ambiguous, but the recipient gains something desirable). Yuill and Perner (1988; 
experiment 2) told participants about an actor's accident or intended action that resulted in a 
positive outcome for a recipient. In the former case, the actor happened to hit the recipient's 
swing, causing her to swing higher. In the latter, the actor pushed the swing intentionally. In a 
forced choice comparison between the actors, even three-year-olds rated the recipient as ‘more 
pleased’ with the actor who behaved intentionally. Because participants heard about only one 
behavior, it is unknown how they would respond after hearing about several unintentional 
behaviors that result in a positive outcome. 
 
We examined children's use of intention (intentional vs. unintentional actions) and frequency 
(one vs. four exemplars) to make trait attributions concerning positive outcomes (i.e., recipient 
benefits from actor's behavior). In addition to predicted differences between the high-
frequency/intentional and low-frequency/unintentional conditions, we expected that the strong 
support in the high-frequency/intentional condition would facilitate children's ability to make 
behavioral predictions. Given that children tend to make positive attributions about others with 
little evidence, we expected that attributions would be generally positive across conditions and 
that this would increase with age (see Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Finally, we assessed children's 
responses to unintended positive outcomes based on frequency. Given children's tendency to 
make outcome-based judgments, we expected that repeated positive outcomes would result in 
positive trait attributions and that children would be more likely to make positive behavioral 
predictions after multiple positive outcomes irrespective of intention status. 
 
Method 
Participants 
There were 128 three- to six-year-olds (36–83 months, M = 58.1, SD = 13.7, 67 girls). 
Participants were recruited from day cares and schools in a mid-sized American city. The 
majority of participants were White; additional demographic information was unavailable. 
Testing took place at the child's school. 
 
Materials 
Toy figures, toy furniture, and miniature toy items illustrated the stories. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Intention was crossed with frequency to create four conditions: low-frequency/intentional, low-
frequency/unintentional, high-frequency/intentional, and high-frequency/unintentional. 
Participants were assigned randomly to one condition. The session ranged from 15 to 20 minutes. 
First, participants received training to ensure understanding of unintentional and intentional 
behaviors. For the unintentional training, children were told about an actor of their gender who 
goes over to say hello' to another actor, but stumbles, ‘Oops! She tripped over the ball. She did 
that by accident. She didn't mean to do that.’ For the intentional scenarios, they were told about 
an actor who wants to play with a second actor, ‘So she kicks the ball over to her. She wanted to 
do that. She meant to do that.’ Afterward, participants were asked ‘Did she mean to do that or 
did she do it by accident?’ Order of scenarios and response options were randomized. If children 
did not answer correctly, the procedure was repeated. Next, there was a test phase that differed 
according to condition as described below (with female versions of the stories). 
 
Low-frequency/intentional 
Participants heard about an actor who engaged in one intentional action and four neutral actions, 
each on a different day. Neutral actions equated the number of scenarios across conditions. Each 
action was presented as taking place on a different day. For the intentional action, they were told, 
‘It's lunch time, and Jane has a whole bunch of things to eat. She sets down her [item] beside her. 
Jane eats her lunch and then gets up to go and play. Oh look! Before she goes, she gives 
____________ to Meg. She did that because she wanted to. She meant to do that. So now Meg 
gets to have it. Meg is really happy about this because she doesn't have a ____________ to play 
with.’ 
For neutral scenarios, participants were told, ‘It's the next day, and it's lunch time again. Jane has 
a whole bunch of things to eat. She sets down her ___________ beside her. Jane eats her lunch 
and then gets up to go and play. Oh look! Jane brings her ___________ with her. Then she goes 
outside. Meg finishes her lunch and also goes outside to play.’ 
 
Afterward, participants were asked a behavioral prediction question about the actor's future 
behavior toward the recipient, ‘It's the next day at school. Jane is eating her lunch. She sets down 
her ___________ beside her. Jane sees Meg. What do you think will happen next? Do you think 
that Jane will give his/her ___________ to Meg or do you think that she will take it with 
him/her?’ The order of the forced choice options was randomized. Then, they were asked a trait 
attribution question, ‘What do you think of Jane? What kind of girl is she?’ Children who did not 
answer spontaneously were asked, ‘Is she nice, mean, or not nice or mean?’ The order of these 
options was randomized except that ‘not nice or mean’ was presented last. Participants were 
asked an intelligence question, ‘Is she a little smart or very smart?’ and a friendship question, ‘If 
you were in this class, would you like to be Jane's friend?’ 
 
High-frequency/intentional 
Participants heard about an actor who engaged in four intentional actions and one neutral action. 
The intentional and neutral actions were similar to those in the low-frequency/intentional 
condition, but varied in item type. The same dependent measures were used as above. 
 
Low-frequency/unintentional 
Participants heard about an actor who engaged in one unintentional action and four neutral 
actions. For the unintentional action, they were told, ‘Today at school, it's lunch time and Jane 
has a whole bunch of things to eat. She sets down her ___________ beside her. Jane eats her 
lunch and then gets up to go and play. Oh look! On the way out, Jane leaves her ___________ 
behind. She did that by accident. She didn't mean to do it. So now Meg gets to have it. Meg is 
really happy about this because she doesn't have any ___________ to play with.’ Neutral 
scenarios were identical to those above. 
 
Participants were asked the same questions as those in the intentional conditions, except for the 
prediction question, which was phrased slightly differently to suit the unintentional context, ‘Do 
you think that she will leave her ___________ behind when she goes, or do you think that she 
will take it with her?’ 
 
High-frequency/unintentional 
Participants heard about an actor who engaged in four unintentional actions and one neutral 
action identical to those in the low-frequency/unintentional condition. Participants were asked 
the same set of questions as those listed above. 
 
For all conditions, the isolated action (i.e., single neutral or target event) was presented in the 
first, third, or fifth position, counterbalanced across children. Also, children were asked 
verification questions (e.g., identification of actors) to ensure that they listened to the stories. 
 
Data Analysis 
Initial chi-square analyses tested whether scores on each dependent variable differed 
significantly between the high-frequency/intentional condition and the low-
frequency/unintentional condition (i.e., the most informative comparison). Logistic regression 
analyses examined the effects of age, frequency, and intention information on each dependent 
variable. Interactions were added individually to determine whether they would contribute 
significantly to the model as assessed by a block χ2 test. 
 
Results 
There were no significant effects of gender or order of the isolated event on any measures. These 
variables were excluded from further analyses. Note that all tests against chance reported below 
were conducted using the binomial distribution. 
 
Prediction of the Actor's Future Behavior 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying that the actor would ‘give’ the item to the recipient 
(intentional condition) or ‘leave behind’ the item (unintentional condition), or a score of 1 for 
saying that the actor would ‘take’ the item with her. A greater number of participants in the high-
frequency/intentional condition predicted that the actor would give an item to the recipient in the 
future whereas a greater number of participants in the low-frequency/unintentional condition 
predicted that the actor would take the item with her in the future χ2(1, N = 62) = 23.29, p 
<.0001. Participants were more likely than expected by chance to say ‘take’ in both unintentional 
conditions (p =.001 in both cases) and more likely to say ‘give’ in the high-frequency/intentional 
condition (p =.001; see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of Participants Who Said ‘Take’ on the Prediction Question by Age and 
Condition. 0 = Give (Intentional) or Leave (Unintentional); 1 = Take. 
 
Notes: Value for high-intentional condition for four-year-olds = 0. For clarity, age is presented 
categorically. Asterisks indicate that findings differ significantly from chance (p <.05). 
Logistic regression analyses revealed that the best fitting model included age, intention, and 
frequency. The overall model was significant, χ2(3, N = 125) = 30.05, p <.0001, RL2 =.29. 
Behavioral predictions did not differ significantly based on age, (β = −.316, Wald = 2.22, p =.14, 
Exp(B) =.72). Participants were more likely to predict that the actor would take the item with her 
after she left it behind once rather than repeatedly (β = −.563, Wald = 7.04, p =.008, Exp(B) 
=.57) and after she left it behind unintentionally rather than intentionally (β = 1.89, Wald= 
19.39, p <.0001, Exp(B) = 6.65). 
Attributions About the Actor's Personality Traits 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying ‘mean’ or 1 for saying ‘nice.’ Data from 8 three- to 
four-year-olds and 7 five- to six-year-olds who chose ‘not nice or mean’ were excluded.1 There 
was no significant difference in children's trait attributions between the high-
frequency/intentional condition and the low-frequency/unintentional condition, χ2(1, N = 51) = 
1.36, p =.244, as the majority of participants said ‘nice.’ Indeed, participants were more likely 
than expected by chance to make an attribution of nice across age and intention type (allps <.01) 
with the exception of the three-year-olds in the intentional conditions; see Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Participants Who Said ‘Nice’ on the Trait Question by Age and 
Condition. 0 = Mean; 1 = Nice. 
 
Note: For clarity, age is presented categorically. Asterisks indicate that findings differ 
significantly from chance. 
 
The best fitting logistic regression model included age, intention, frequency, and the age × 
intention interaction. The model was significant, χ2(4, N = 109) = 14.75, p <.01, RL2 =.24. Trait 
attributions did not differ significantly with age (β =.33, Wald =.68, p =.41, Exp(B) = 1.39), and 
there were no significant effects of frequency (β =.422, Wald = 1.62, p =.21, Exp(B) = 1.32) or 
intention (β = −1.788, Wald = 2.29,p =.13, Exp(B) = 5.97) on participants' trait attributions. The 
age × intention interaction was significant (β = −.249, Wald = 4.36, p =.037, Exp(B) = 12.1). 
Trait attributions for unintentional behaviors did not vary significantly with age (β = 
−.349, Wald =.739, p =.39, Exp(B) = 1.42). In contrast, younger children were less likely than 
older children to say ‘nice’ after hearing about intentional behaviors (β = 2.67, Wald = 
5.95, p =.015, Exp(B) = 14.42). This effect was driven by a tendency of the three-year-olds to 
say ‘mean’ in the low-frequency/intentional condition (M =.33, SE =.21) but not the high-
frequency/intentional condition (i.e., in which they tended to say ‘nice’, M =.80, SE =.20). 
Attributions About the Actor's Intelligence 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying ‘a little smart’ or 1 for saying ‘very smart.’ There 
was no significant difference in intelligence attributions between the high-frequency/intentional 
condition and the low-frequency/unintentional condition, χ2(1, N = 64) =.29, p =.59, as the 
majority of participants said ‘very smart.’ Participants were more likely than expected by chance 
to say ‘very smart’ than ‘a little smart’ in the low-frequency/intentional condition (p =.05) and 
the high-frequency/intentional condition (p =.02). The overall logistic regression model was not 
significant, χ2(3, N = 128) = 4.20, p =.24, RL2 =.05. 
Friendship With the Actor 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying ‘no’ or 1 for saying ‘yes.’ There was no significant 
difference in response patterns between the high-frequency/intentional and low-
frequency/unintentional conditions, χ2(1, N = 57) =.404, p =.525. Participants were more likely 
than expected by chance to say that they would befriend the actor (i.e., respond ‘yes’) in all 
conditions (all ps <.01). The logistic regression model was not significant, χ2(3, N = 120) 
=.943, p =.815, RL2 =.01. 
Discussion 
To some extent, children integrated intention and frequency information when making 
behavioral predictions about positive outcomes. Participants predicted that an actor who shared 
intentionally many times would do so again, and the high-frequency/intentional condition was 
the only one for which children predicted that the recipient would receive an item (i.e., ‘give’ 
prediction). The difference between the most informative and least informative conditions 
suggests that children do not make indiscriminate predictions and instead consider the strength of 
the evidence. Despite the rich cues, only four- and six-year-olds were more likely than expected 
by chance to expect giving in the high-frequency/intentional condition. Although the mean for 
the five-year-olds was in the expected direction, the chance-level performance of both this group 
and the three-year-olds is consistent with research indicating that children have difficulty making 
behavior-to-behavior inferences (Liu et al., 2007). 
 
Also of interest was children's processing of unintentional action based on frequency. Contrary 
to predictions, participants as a group expected that an actor who left an item behind would 
correct the error irrespective of frequency. This is somewhat surprising given a large literature 
that indicates that children engage in statistical learning early in life (e.g., Marcovitch & 
Lewkowicz, 2009). However, this pattern held true only for the three-year-olds, who had strong 
expectations of goal-directed behavior. This is consistent with evidence of particular sensitivity 
to intention information early in life. For example, even 18-month-olds will reproduce an actor's 
goal, rather than his or her error, when it was not attained (see Meltzoff, 1995). In contrast, 
expectations about unintentional behavior changed with age such that variations in frequency, as 
well as intention, had a greater influence on behavioral predictions (i.e., children considered both 
cues). Indeed, recent research indicates that there are advances in statistical learning with age 
(Arciuli & Simpson, 2011). By six years, children expected that a single unintentional behavior 
would not recur, but showed chance performance as a group for multiple behaviors. 
 
As expected, trait attributions were generally positive, likely due to the lack of basis for a 
negative trait attribution. It is also possible that the neutral information in the unintentional 
conditions was perceived positively (see Grant & Mills, 2011) or that the positive outcome 
across conditions contributed to positive trait attributions (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 1998). There 
were two exceptions to this pattern. First, 15 participants responded ‘not nice or mean,’ 7 of 
whom were in the low-frequency/unintentional condition. These children may have been 
reluctant to make a trait attribution given so little information. Second, three-year-olds exhibited 
chance-level responding in the intentional conditions, although the mean for the high-
frequency/intentional condition was in the expected direction. These children tended to attribute 
meanness to an actor who gave the recipient an item only once. One potential explanation is that 
three-year-olds viewed the purportedly neutral interactions as missed opportunities for giving. 
 
Across conditions, children wanted to befriend the actor, consistent with previous research in 
which children readily endorse a desire for affiliation (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2008). Apparently, 
children were unperturbed by forgetful behaviors, perhaps because such behaviors are not seen 
as aversive. As with the positive trait attributions, the decision to befriend actors may have been 
based on the lack of negative information about them. Consistent with the notion that positive 
behaviors are associated with intelligence, there was a tendency to label the actor as smart. 
However, children were especially likely to do so in the intentional conditions, suggesting that 
they associated goal-directed behavior with intelligence. It is somewhat surprising that 
participants made positive attributions about the actor's intelligence even in the high-
frequency/unintentional condition in which items were left behind repeatedly. The decreased 
tendency with age to describe the actor as ‘very smart’ may reflect the notion that repeated 
forgetting reflects lower intelligence. 
 
 
Experiment 2 
We examined children's use of behavioral frequency and intention information to make trait 
attributions concerning negative behavioral outcomes. Some research indicates that younger 
children require more behavioral exemplars than older children to make a negative trait 
attribution (Boseovski & Lee, 2006) or behavioral prediction (Ferguson et al., 1986). In other 
cases, one behavior is sufficient (e.g., Liu et al., 2007). These discrepancies likely reflect 
differences in the amount of information provided or the response options presented. For 
example, Boseovski and Lee gave children three options (e.g., ‘Is he nice, mean, or not nice or 
mean?’) whereas Liu et al. provided the trait label (‘Is Bobby selfish?’). 
 
There are also mixed findings concerning sensitivity to intentions regarding negative outcomes. 
Preschoolers distinguish negative from positive intentions (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 1998) and 
some research indicates that children also differentiate between intentional and unintentional 
negative outcomes when making negative trait attributions (Rotenberg, 1980). For example, 
three- to seven-year-olds judged an actor more harshly when he knocked a girl off a swing 
intentionally rather than by accident (Yuill & Perner, 1988). However, this ability is nascent in 
early to middle childhood. Grant and Mills (2011) reported that the use of information about 
negative intentions to make behavioral predictions peaked between 10 and 13 years of age. 
Moreover, as is the case with positive information, younger children tend to be more outcome-
focused than older children (e.g., Zelazo et al., 1996). 
 
We expected that participants would be more likely to make negative trait attributions about 
actors who engaged in high-frequency, intentional behaviors than low-frequency, unintentional 
behaviors and that behavioral predictions would be strongest in the high-frequency/intentional 
condition. In contrast to previous research in which children judged actors positively despite 
negative behaviors, we predicted that children would make negative attributions in this highly 
informative condition. We expected that children would be hesitant to make negative trait 
attributions under unintentional circumstances, particularly when they occurred infrequently, and 
that this effect would increase with age. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A new group of 128 three- to seven-year-olds was tested (36–88 months, M = 59.2, SD = 13.5, 
63 girls). Participants were of mixed ethnic/racial identity: 55.1 percent White, 9.6 percent 
African American,.7 percent Latino/Hispanic,.7 percent Asian, 1.5 percent Native American, and 
1.5 percent who self-classified as multiracial. An additional 30.1 percent did not report on this 
variable. Families were from middle to upper-middle-class backgrounds. 
 
Materials 
The same materials were used as in experiment 1. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The same conditions were created as in experiment 1, with negative rather than positive 
behavioral outcomes. After intentionality training, procedures differed by condition. 
 
Low-frequency/intentional 
Participants heard about an actor who engaged in one intentional action and four neutral actions. 
For the intentional action, participants were told, ‘It's recess and Sam wants to play. Sam sits 
down next to Bobby. Then, he gets up to go and play on the swings. Oh look! Sam took Bobby's 
ball away from him to the swings. He did that because he wanted to, he meant to do that. Bobby 
is really sad because he doesn't have a ball to play with.’ For the neutral scenarios, participants 
were told, for example, ‘It's the next day, and it's recess again and Sam wants to play. Sam sits 
down to play in the sand for a while. Then, Sam gets up to go and play on the swings.’ 
 
Afterward, children were asked a behavioral prediction question, ‘It's the next day at school. Sam 
is playing at recess. Then, Sam gets up to go play on the swings. What do you think will happen 
next?’ Do you think Sam will take Bobby's toy or leave it behind?’ Next, children were asked a 
trait attribution question, ‘What do you think of Sam?’ Children who did not respond 
spontaneously were given forced-choice options as in experiment 1. Children were asked the 
same intelligence and friendship questions as in experiment 1. 
 
High-frequency/intentional 
Participants heard about an actor who engaged in four intentional actions and one neutral action. 
The intentional and neutral actions were identical to those in the low-frequency/intentional 
condition. Participants were asked the same questions as above. 
 
Low-frequency/unintentional 
Participants heard about one unintentional action and four neutral actions. For the unintentional 
action, children were told: ‘Today at school it's recess, and Sam wants to play. He sits down next 
to Bobby. Then, Sam gets up to go and play on the swings. Oh look! Sam took Bobby's ball 
away from him to the swings. He did that by accident. He didn't mean to do it. Bobby is really 
sad because he doesn't have a ball to play with.’ The neutral actions and questions were the same 
as those above. 
 
High-frequency/unintentional 
Participants heard about four unintentional actions and one neutral action that were identical to 
those for the low-frequency/unintentional condition. Participants were asked the same questions 
as those described above. 
 
Results 
Prediction of the Actor's Future Behavior 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying that the actor would ‘leave’ the item behind and a 
score of 1 for saying that the actor would ‘take’ the item. There was no significant difference in 
behavioral predictions between the high-frequency/intentional condition and the low-
frequency/unintentional condition, χ2(1, N = 64) = 1.46, p =.226. Figure 3 presents means by age 
and condition. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of Participants Who Said ‘Take’ on the Prediction Question by Age and 
Condition. 0 = Leave; 1 = Take. 
 
Note: For clarity, age is presented categorically. Asterisks indicate that findings differ 
significantly from chance. 
The best fitting logistic regression model included age, intention, and frequency. The model was 
significant, χ2(3, N = 128) = 8.82, p =.03, RL2 =.11. Older children were more likely than 
younger children to say that the actor would ‘take’ the item (β =.507, Wald = 4.89, p =.027, 
Exp(B) =.602). Three- and four-year-olds were more likely than expected by chance to predict 
that the actor would ‘take’ the item in the high-frequency conditions whereas the five- and six-
year-olds did so in the low- and high-frequency conditions (all ps <.05; except p =.07 for the 
three-year-olds). There was no significant effect of intention. Participants were more likely than 
expected by chance say that the actor would ‘take’ the item in both the intentional 
(M =.75, SE =.05) and unintentional conditions (M =.76, SE =.05); ps <.01. 
Attributions About the Actor's Personality 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying that the actor was ‘nice’ or 1 for saying that the actor 
was ‘mean.’ Data from 6 three- to four-year-olds and 7 five- to six-year-olds who chose ‘not nice 
or mean’ were excluded.2 A greater number of participants judged the character as ‘mean’ in the 
high-frequency/intentional condition than the low-frequency/unintentional condition, χ2(1, N = 
57) = 7.53, p =.006. The best fitting logistic regression model included age, intention, and 
frequency, χ2(3, N = 113) = 11.1, p =.01, RL2 =.13. Younger children were more likely than older 
children to say ‘mean’ (β = −.393, Wald = 3.4, p =.06, Exp(B) =.675). Participants were more 
likely to say ‘mean’ after hearing about intentional rather than unintentional taking (β 
=.895, Wald = 4.87, p =.027, Exp(B) = 2.45) (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of Participants Who Said ‘Mean’ on the Trait Question by Age and 
Condition. 0 = nice; 1 = mean. 
 
Notes: For clarity, age is presented categorically. Asterisks indicate that findings differ 
significantly from chance (p <.05). 
Attributions About the Actor's Intelligence 
Participants received a score of 0 for saying ‘a little smart’ or 1 for saying ‘very smart.’ 
Participants' attributions of intelligence did not differ significantly between the high-
frequency/intentional and low-frequency/unintentional conditions. For all conditions, 
participants exhibited chance-level responding (all ps >.20). The logistic regression model was 
significant, χ2(3, N = 128) = 10.06, p =.02, RL2 =.10. Younger participants (M =.59, SE =.06) 
were more likely than older participants (M =.33, SE =.06) to say ‘very smart’ (β = −.50, Wald = 
6.78, p =.009, Exp(B) =.605). There were no significant effects of frequency or intention. 
Friendship With the Actor 
Participants' selections differed significantly for the high-frequency/intentional and low-
frequency/unintentional conditions, χ2(1, N = 63) = 7.45, p =.006. Participants in the low-
frequency/unintentional condition were more likely than expected by chance to say that they 
would befriend the actor (M =.77, SE =.07), t(30) = 3.59, p =.001 whereas participants in the 
high-frequency/intentional condition exhibited random responding (M =.44, SE =.08), t(31) = 
−.70, p =.48. 
The logistic regression model was significant, χ2(3, N = 127) = 9.37, p =.025, RL2 =.10. There 
were no significant effects of age or frequency on friendship selections. Participants were more 
likely to befriend the actor after hearing about unintentional negative behavior (M =.76, SE =.05) 
rather than intentional negative behavior (M =.55, SE =.06), (β = −.99, Wald = 6.40, p =.01). 
Furthermore, participants were more likely than expected by chance to befriend the actor in the 
unintentional conditions (ps <.001) but not the intentional conditions (ps >.10). 
Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, participants did not predict future negative behavior more frequently in 
the high-intentional condition as compared to the low-unintentional condition. However, all 
groups, except for the four-year-olds, were more likely than expected by chance to predict taking 
in the high-frequency/intentional condition. Thus, provision of intention and frequency generally 
enhanced children's ability to make behavioral predictions, which are typically difficult (Liu 
et al., 2007). High-frequency information was especially influential to the three- and four-year-
olds, who predicted taking only after multiple exemplars, consistent with previous findings that 
young children require a greater number of behavioral exemplars than older children to make 
trait attributions (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). 
 
Overall, intention alone did not impact behavioral predictions, although the results were in the 
expected direction for the low versus high intentional conditions. The use of unintentional 
information was not straightforward. As a group, children did not expect correction of accidental 
taking, but the specific patterns across frequency varied with age. For example, the youngest 
children performed at chance whereas the oldest children expected taking irrespective of the 
number of accidental occurrences. Overall, behavioral outcome seemed to have a greater impact 
on predictions than in experiment 1, a finding that we address in the General Discussion. 
 
Trait attributions were differentiated as expected: as a group, participants were more likely to say 
‘mean’ in the high-frequency/intentional condition than the low-frequency/unintentional 
condition. However, consistent with previous research (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2006), 
participants were somewhat reluctant to say ‘mean.’ This was particularly true for the four- and 
five-year-olds irrespective of information type. Although the three- and six-year-olds technically 
exhibited chance responding, inspection of the means revealed a tendency to say ‘mean’ in the 
high-frequency/intentional condition, indicating that these children make negative attributions 
when given extensive evidence. The five- and six-year-olds were less likely than expected by 
chance to say ‘mean’ in the unintentional conditions (i.e., said ‘nice’). 
 
Children's answers to the intelligence question were random irrespective of cue. In contrast to the 
association between intentionality and higher intelligence for positive behaviors, negative 
behaviors were not systematically associated with low or high intelligence. The majority of 
participants were highly likely to want to befriend an actor who caused a single unintended 
negative outcome, but were ambivalent about befriending an actor who intentionally caused 
multiple negative outcomes. This is consistent with previous findings indicating that three- to 
six-year-olds choose not to befriend mean actors (Lane et al., in press). 
 
 
General Discussion 
We examined whether children integrate frequency and intention in a meaningful way to make 
trait attributions and behavioral predictions. Generally, we expected that participants would be 
more likely to make relevant trait attributions and behavioral predictions in highly informative 
(i.e., high-frequency/intentional rather than low-frequency/unintentional) circumstances. 
 
Summary of Findings 
In experiment 1, participants showed the expected pattern for behavioral predictions, but not trait 
attributions. Generally, children judged the actors as ‘nice’. The only difference in attributions 
across conditions was that actors who behaved intentionally rather than unintentionally were 
deemed more intelligent. Children as a group expected that unintentional behaviors would not 
occur again irrespective of frequency. Finally, children chose to befriend actors across 
conditions. In experiment 2, participants did not show the anticipated pattern for behavioral 
predictions. Instead, they predicted taking readily, although younger children benefited from 
high-frequency information. However, participants as a group were more likely to say ‘mean’ 
after viewing multiple, intentional behaviors rather than one behavior, revealing the expected 
pattern for trait attributions. Younger children were more likely than older children to attribute 
meanness and higher intelligence to the actor. Friendship choices followed the expected pattern. 
 
Insights About Children's Theory of Personality 
Frequency and intention information are not used in a straightforward manner for trait 
judgments; use of the cues varied based on judgment type (prediction vs. attribution) and 
outcome valence. Several insights can be gleaned from these studies. With increasing age, 
children tend to attribute niceness to others under conditions of positively valenced or minimal 
information. The latter is consistent with reports that children judge people as nice in the absence 
of negative cues (e.g., Grant & Mills, 2011; Jones & Thomson, 2001). This pattern extended to 
friendship attributions, but less so to intelligence attributions, which became increasingly neutral 
with age. Perhaps this reflects increased awareness over time that intelligence cannot be inferred 
based on niceness. 
 
Notably, children's attributions about others were not solely positive. Children made negative 
attributions when they were given negative behavioral information, but they had a higher 
threshold for doing so with increasing age (i.e., required high-frequency, intentional 
information). Participants were reluctant to say ‘mean’, as the majority of responses were 
random across conditions or instead were attributions of ‘nice’ when characters behaved 
negatively unintentionally. These findings extend previous research (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 
2006) in revealing that children's reluctance to make negative attributions is unlikely to be 
explained solely by an assumption that negative behavior is unintentional: the actor's negative 
intentions were mentioned on every trial. These findings also suggest that difficulties with trait 
attribution are unlikely to be explained solely by a representational deficit account, given that 
children were provided with explicit reminders about intention. 
 
These findings also revealed dissociations between trait attributions and behavioral predictions, 
particularly in that there are limits to children's willingness to give the benefit of the doubt to 
others concerning expectations for future behavior. Participants needed abundant evidence to 
predict future intentional giving but not future intentional taking, and this was especially true for 
older children. This may result from heightened vigilance for the negative actions of others that 
could indicate threat (see Baltazar, Shutts, & Kinzler, 2012), irrespective of whether the actor is 
ultimately labeled negatively. In contrast, whether it occurs intentionally or unintentionally, 
receiving items is a low-stake situation. Moreover, despite the strong support cues, children had 
difficulties with behavioral predictions, consistent with previous research (Liu et al., 2007). 
Participants assigned positive traits readily, but required multiple, explicit exemplars to predict 
giving, with only some children benefitting from this information. For negative outcomes, 
children readily predicted taking, but this was again more pronounced in the high-intentional 
condition. Despite the difficulties, the finding that even the three-year-olds predicted future 
taking in the latter case suggests that strong support had somewhat of a facilitative effect on 
behavioral predictions. 
 
Finally, this research reveals novel information about children's treatment of unintentional 
information based on age, frequency, and valence. Although the youngest children expected 
goal-directed behavior in the context of positive outcomes, responses were unsystematic by six 
years of age. This pattern may reflect a struggle to integrate frequency information with intention 
information as children approach middle childhood. It is possible that those children who 
predicted future accidental taking after it happened repeatedly saw this behavior as trait-like (i.e., 
forgetfulness). In contrast, for negative outcomes, children readily predicted negative behavior. 
There are many possible explanations for this pattern. As mentioned above, this response is 
consistent with the notion of heightened vigilance to the possibility of negative future actions to 
avoid harmful or aversive situations, although it is unclear why children often labeled these same 
actors favorably. Another possibility concerns the ‘side-effect’ effect wherein children assume 
that negative outcomes that an actor caused, but does not know or care about, are intentional 
(Leslie et al., 2006; Pellizzoni, Siegal, & Surian, 2009). Although actors' unintentional behavior 
was emphasized, the salience of the negative outcome, coupled with lack of information about 
actors' knowledge of the outcome, may have influenced responses. Based on the view that people 
who behave intentionally rather than unintentionally are more intelligent, children may have 
been motivated to continue to view the actors positively (i.e., by assuming that they would act 
intentionally). 
 
Across experiments, another explanation concerns the response options offered for the prediction 
questions and children's assumptions about the type of behavior that is intentional. Specifically, 
children may have expected future behavior to be intentional irrespective of outcome valence, 
but their ideas about intentionality may be tied to action rather than inaction. This explains the 
tendency to say ‘take’ in the unintentional conditions of both studies; the word itself may be 
associated with intentional action. Moreover, participants may have said ‘take’ excessively in 
experiment 2 because it was used in all scenarios, in contrast to the unintentional conditions in 
experiment 1.3 It is also likely that children are more accustomed to accidents with negative than 
positive outcomes. 
 
Concerning trait attributions associated with unintentional negative outcomes, four-, five-, and 
six-year-olds made positive attributions more than expected by chance in at least one 
unintentional condition whereas three-year-olds performed at chance levels on this question. 
Thus, with age, children appear to gain increased sensitivity that unintentional information does 
not necessarily warrant a negative trait attribution. Notably, however, even three-year-olds were 
more likely to choose to befriend the actor in the unintentional negative conditions as compared 
to the intentional negative conditions, suggesting that specific contexts may elicit greater 
sensitivity to unintentional behavior by young children. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are limitations in these studies that warrant discussion. First, we used a between-subjects 
design to maximize the possibility that participants would keep in mind both frequency and 
intention and minimize confusion resulting from cue variations across stories. However, this 
design may have obscured children's abilities at trait reasoning. Had participants been given the 
opportunity to make judgments across scenarios, they may have shown stronger differentiation 
between their judgments. Use of a within-subject design might allow for better detection of 
sophistication in children's trait reasoning. 
 
Second, a controlled investigation of the cues necessitated the use of somewhat artificial stories. 
Children are not typically given explicit information about intentions when judging behavior. 
Although our goal was to examine the ability to make trait attributions under maximally 
supportive conditions, the nature of the unintentional conditions may have been problematic. 
Specifically, the extent to which children found the evidence plausible is unclear, particularly in 
the case of high-frequency, unintentional behaviors. As noted above, the use of the word ‘take’ 
may have implied intention and led to undue influence on these results. The interpretation of the 
neutral story information was another issue in that it may have been interpreted somewhat 
negatively by the three-year-olds when contrasted with the positive target information. Although 
there was no obvious indication that children found the stories to be strange, it will be important 
to study the interpretation of intention information more naturalistically in future research. 
 
Third, the behavioral exemplars presented were variations along one theme (i.e., taking or 
sharing). This was done to maximize children's ability to form an integrated impression from the 
events presented. However, provision of several representative behaviors of each trait (e.g., for 
niceness: helping a person cross the street; picking up dropped papers) may have resulted in a 
greater tendency to make trait-consistent judgments. In future research, the effects of exemplars 
that vary in quality, not just quantity, should be examined systematically. 
 
Finally, future research should aim to identify mechanisms that underlie the age-related change 
described here. As noted by Heyman (2009), we know little about the degree to which trait 
reasoning draws on domain-general versus domain-specific mechanisms. An investigation of 
children's executive functioning abilities may be particularly fruitful in this regard. Young and 
Saxe (2009) suggest that very strong representations, combined with increased cognitive control, 
are particularly important for overriding the salience of negative outcome information in 
situations of accidental harm. Thus, individual differences in executive functioning might predict 
children's performance on tasks like the one presented here. From a practical standpoint, it will 
also be important to understand how the individual differences in the processing of frequency, 
intention, and valence information impact children's social relations in everyday life. 
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